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The family of views known as disjunctivism first emerged in the phi-
losophy of perception as an alternative to the causal theory. These views are 
the subject of intense contemporary debate, and the essays collected in these 
two volumes offer some of their best articulations and criticisms . As Alex 
Byrne and Heather Logue suggest in their introduction to the collection they 
have edited, the two volumes are best thought as complementing each other. 
The collection by Byrne and Logue, Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings 
(hereafter DCR) aims to bring together some of the most important essays, 
and book selections, previously published elsewhere. The volume edited by 
Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, 
Knowledge (hereafter PAK) includes almost exclusively new material by 
both prominent defenders and critics of disjunctivism (only the contribution 
by John McDowell had been previously published, in this very journal). The 
standard of all contributions is generally very high, and there is no doubt that 
these books are essential reading for anybody interested in the philosophy of 
perception. 
So what is  disjunctivism? It is not easily characterised as one thing, and 
here may lie one reason why the introductions to both volumes are dedicated 
to the taxonomy and clarification of the numerous and different views that 
are referred to by the label. One of the factors which explains the difficulty 
with providing a crisp definition of disjunctivism is that this approach can be 
found in three different areas of philosophy, whilst indicating something dif-
ferent in each. A further source of difficulty is the fact that within one of 
these areas – the philosophy of perception – disjunctivism has taken numer-
ous non equivalent forms. Given these complexities and since it is impossible 
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in a short critical notice to give the necessary space and attention to every 
contribution in these volumes, in this piece I propose to consider the main 
disjunctivist positions in the philosophy of perception, epistemology and the 
philosophy of action. These are the three areas in which disjunctivism has 
emerged and work by exponents and critics of these positions is well repre-
sented in these volumes. As a result of the survey I present here, I hope that it 
will become obvious that disjunctivism is not one thing, and that its prospects 
differ in different areas. 
 
A. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION 
 
When disjunctivism first emerged it was thought as an alternative to the 
causal theory in the philosophy of perception. Its early exponents were J. M. 
Hinton and Paul Snowdon. Selections from their pioneering work are well-
represented in DCR, whilst PAK includes a useful piece by Snowdon on Hin-
ton’s views. The causal theory of perception offers, what seemed in the 
1970s, an overwhelmingly convincing account of the necessary conditions 
for perceiving an object. The theory states that the object of a perception 
must be the cause of the ensuing perceptual experience. It  is  thus able to ex-
plain why, for example, I cannot be said to see a rose, which is in front of me, 
when I have the experience of seeming to see a rose but there is a hologram 
of the rose between me and the flower. Both Hinton and Snowdon treat the 
causal theory as offering a conceptual analysis of perceiving, seeing, hearing 
and so forth. They also both attack the account of the nature of experience 
which they think is presupposed by the causal theory.  
In their view the causal theory presupposes that the perceiver has ex-
periences of the same mental kind when she is seeing an object and when she 
is undergoing an hallucination which she cannot by reflective introspection 
alone tell apart from the case of genuine perception. The causal theory ex-
plains the difference between the two cases by way of reference to the pres-
ence in the veridical case of an extra -mental factor involving the existence of 
an appropriate causal chain from the object of perception to the experience. 
Both Hinton and Snowdon point out that the assumption that the perceiver 
can have experiences of the same kind, when perceiving and when hallucinat-
ing, is unwarranted. Just because the perceiver cannot tell them apart it does 
not follow that the experiences are not different. 
Snowdon deploys this argument to show that the causal theory of per-
ception if correct is an empirical, rather than conceptual, truth about percep-
tion. Hinton goes further. He commits himself to the view that perceptions 
and hallucinations always involve experiences of different kinds. More spe-
cifically, Hinton argues that statements such as ‘It looks as if there is a rose in 
front of me’, where ‘looks’ is understood phenomenologically rather than 
epistemically, are not reports of a single mental state (an inner experience) 
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common between perceptions and matching hallucination. Instead, these 
statements are shorthand for disjunctions such as ‘Either I see that there is a 
rose in front of me (which looks like a rose) or I am having a perfect illusion 
of seeing a rose’. Obviously, the equivalence of look-statements to these dis-
junctions can be accepted by everybody. What would distinguish the disjunc-
tivist is the claim that perceptions and hallucinations involve experiences of 
different kinds. This, however, is not quite right. Because this claim also can 
be accepted by many who would not think of themselves as disjunctivists. 
One way of fleshing out this idea that the good veridical and the bad 
hallucinatory or perhaps illusory cases involve mental states of different 
kinds is to think of mental kinds as typed by their representational content, 
and claim that the representational content of the good case is object-
dependent. However, when the idea that the good and the bad cases involve 
different experiences is developed in this way, it becomes apparent that this 
commitment is shared by those externalists who think that the representa-
tional contents of perceptual experiences are object-dependent. In other 
words, it becomes apparent that the claim about different kinds of experience 
is not sufficient to distinguish disjunctivists from their opponents. The dis-
junctivist claim, therefore needs to be stronger, its supporter will have to say 
that there is no common ele ment whatsoever between the veridical and the 
hallucinatory experience. Hence, as Byrne and Logue make abundantly clear 
in ‘Either/Or’ (in PAK) a moderate view of experience is  available. Its sup-
porters deny that experiences are purely inner, but unlike disjunctivists , they 
claim that experiences of perceptions and hallucinations have common men-
tal features. These common features, which are likely to be representational 
features of the state, explain why perceptions and hallucinations can share the 
same phenomenology. 
The possibility of a moderate view severely weakens the motivation for 
disjunctivism. The supporter of disjunctivism thought she could make a case 
for the claim that her position must be thought of as the default view. This is 
a train of thought first broached by Hinton but subsequently developed in 
great detail by M. G. F. Martin (whose ‘The Reality of Appearances’ and 
‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’ are reprinted in DCR). Hinton’s insight was 
that his opponent simply assumed that if a subject cannot discriminate be-
tween some of her experiences these must be the same, the disjunctivist 
points out that this conclusion does not follow. Thus, the burden of proof 
would be clearly on the shoulder of the Cartesian opponent. Furthermore, the 
opponent appears to have extra difficulties since he is trying to define the 
identity of experiences (a transitive notion) in terms of their indiscriminabil-
ity (a notion which is notoriously intransitive). The emergence of a moderate 
position shifts the burden of proof on the shoulders of the disjunctivist who 
now needs to show why one must claim that these experiences have nothing 
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in common. The moderate position that they do not belong to the same type, 
but have common features now appears as the default position. 
Be that as it may, disjunctivism about experience faces numerous chal-
lenges. Perhaps, one of the best known arguments against the view is the so-
called causal argument elaborated by Howard Robinson in his book Percep-
tion (a selection is reprinted in DCR). The argument is based on two prem-
ises: 1. It must be possible that in some instances the brain of a perceiver 
when genuinely perceiving is in the kind of neural state her brain is in when 
she hallucinates and 2. If two experiences have the same neural proximate 
cause then they must be given the same account. Hence, disjunctivism about 
experience must be false. The disjunctivist would typically reject the princi-
ple underlying the second claim, and in doing so they will not be alone since 
many externalists would also do the same. 
There is, however, a different variant of the causal argument, which 
raises more problems for disjunctivism. This version has been developed by 
Mark Johnson in his  ‘The Obscure Object of Hallucination” also collected in 
DCR. Johnston formulates the argument in terms of the possibility of a sub-
jectively seamless transition from hallucination to veridical perception, and 
claims that disjunctivists cannot account for it. But what is of interest here is 
a different argument which is also deployed by Johnson. We have seen that 
the disjunctivist can simply reject the original version of the causal argument 
by saying that veridical perceptions have object-dependent contents. Since 
the external object is absent in the case of hallucinations, they must have dif-
ferent contents and so must belong to different kinds. However, consider now 
the case of an hallucination; its content does not depend on the existence of 
an external object. Thus, we must consider the possibility that the content of 
the hallucination is common with the veridical perception (which, however, 
would also have some extra object-dependent content). The advantage of 
positing the existence of a common core is that it facilitates an explanation of 
the possibility of seamless transitions from hallucinations to perceptions. 
Thus, Johnston’s view can be seen as an example of the moderate position 
which, with disjunctivism rejects the view of experience as inner together 
with the claim that in experience we are not in direct contact with reality, but 
unlike disjunctivism postulates the existence of some common mental fea-
tures between the good and bad cases. A similar moderate position about ex-
perience is also defended by Alan Millar in a paper reprinted in DCR. 
So far I have fleshed out disjunctivism about experience as a view about 
the representational content of experience, since I have taken mental states to 
be typed on the basis of their content. However, many – if not most – supporters 
of the approach do not follow this path. One who does is  Sonia Sedivy who, in 
her contribution to PAK, defends the view that perceptual content is both ob-
ject and property involving. Most disjunctivists, however, subscribe to rela-
tional accounts of perception and thus resist attributing any representational 
5                                                 The Non-Conjunctive Nature of Disjunctivism 
content to veridical perceptual experiences. Supporters of the relational the-
ory do not always make a commitment to this kind of disjunctivism explicit, 
even though they must be so committed. It is for this reason, I presume, that 
the work of Charles Travis or John Campbell is not collected in either of 
these two volumes. 
The supporters of the relational theory of perception also owe us an ac-
count of the phenomenal character of perception. They need to account for 
the what it is like of experience. This position, which following Haddock and 
Macpherson, is best dubbed ‘phenomenal disjunctivism’ has in Martin its 
best known defender. It is perhaps the view with which the largest number of 
contributions in these two books are engaged. As Haddock and Macpherson 
observe disjunctivism about experience does not entail phenomenal disjunc-
tivism, and my discussion above should make it clear that this is the case. On 
the other hand, as is also observed by Haddock and Macpherson, phenomenal 
disjunctivism entails disjunctivism about experience. 
Martin presents his brand of disjunctivism as a defence of Naïve Real-
ism and as an opponent of both sense-datum theories and intentionalism with 
regard to their answers to the phenomenological argument from illusion. 
Martin intends to defend the naïve realist view that experience is phenome-
nally transparent because the objects themselves and their properties consti-
tute the phenomenology of veridical experiences. Quite obviously, a different 
account needs to be provided for both illusions and hallucinations. There are 
several different ways the supporter of naïve realism can defend her position 
against the argument from illusions. Martin’s account is framed in negative 
terms. In his view it is a mistake to assume that if two mental states cannot be 
told apart by reflective introspection alike, they must have the same phe-
nomenal character. If we do not make this assumption, all we can say about 
veridical perceptions and matching hallucinations is that they share the epis-
temic feature of being indistinguishable from the veridical case. The sense of 
indiscriminability deployed by Martin is impersonal, rather than relative to 
the different discriminatory abilities of subjects. The disjunctivist, in Martin’s 
view, should resist any demand to present a positive account of hallucination 
(such a demand is made by Jonathan Dancy, for example, in a paper reprinted 
in DCR). The disjunctivist can refuse to present a positive view of the phe-
nomenal character of hallucinations, Martin holds, because his position is the 
default view since it is  his opponent who is making an unargued assumption. 
However, the existence of moderate views which extend to accounts of phe-
nomenal character undercuts this claim. It also weakens Martin’s claim on 
behalf of disjunctivism to be the only view that accounts fully for the trans-
parency of experience (understood here so strongly as to require that objects 
and their manifest properties are among its constituents). 
In ‘The Reality of Appearances’ Martin is agnostic as to whether there 
are common features between perceptions and hallucinations which might 
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explain why they cannot be told apart despite the fact that they do not have 
phenomenal characters of the same kind. Hence, in this paper Martin takes 
what I have called ‘the moderate view’ to be a form of disjunctivism. What 
mattered to him in that paper is that perceptions and hallucinations do not be-
long to the same ‘fundamental kind’ which is the only one which actually ex-
plains the character of perceptions. 
Under pressure from the modified version of the causal argument dis-
cussed above, Martin’s position has changed with regard to matching hallu-
cinations. In ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’ he argues that if in these 
instances one could explain the character of hallucinations by reference to 
their shared features with veridical perception, these features –rather than its 
relation to reality – would also explain the character of the corresponding 
matching perceptions. Hence, he holds that no positive account for hallucina-
tions of this sort is possible. Yet this enforced silence has not found much 
support among other disjunctivists. It has also been subject to intense criti-
cism, the papers by Susanna Siegel and by A.D. Smith (both in PAK) offer 
sustained criticisms of Martin’s epistemological account of illusions and hal-
lucinations. The negativity of Martin’s position is also rejected by some fel-
low disjunctivists, in particular William Fish who in ‘Disjunctivism, 
Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination’ (in PAK) offers a posi-
tive account of hallucinations which grounds their indiscriminability from 
veridical perception in the similarity of their effects (a similar view is also 
presented by Scott Sturgeon in his essay also in PAK). 
As it should be clear from the discussion above, in my view the jury is 
still out about the viability of disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception. 
At least in the case of phenomenal disjunctivism it might be the case that 
non-conjunctive moderate views have the upper hand. 
 
B. PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
The most prominent exponent of disjunctivism in epistemology is  John 
McDowell and selections from his  paper ‘Criteria Defeasibility, and Knowl-
edge’ are included in DCR. This paper contains one of McDowell’s earliest 
formulation of his views which have been extremely influential. McDowell 
asks us to compare cases where I can tell how things are in my immediate 
environment by looking with deceptive cases where one is mislead by ap-
pearances. It is tempting to say that because from a subjective point of view it 
is impossible to discriminate between the two cases, the evidence provided 
by experience must be the same in both cases. That is to say, it is tempting to 
believe that in both kind of cases our experience provides us with at most de-
feasible evidence for our perceptual knowledge. In this paper, and elsewhere, 
McDowell urges us to resist this temptation, and reject what he calls ‘the 
highest common factor’ view according to which the evidence for our per-
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ceptual knowledge must be something wh ich is available in both the decep-
tive and the non-deceptive cases. Instead, McDowell claims that in the non-
deceptive cases, our evidence does not fall short of the facts. The facts them-
selves are our experiential intake on which our non-inferential knowledge is 
based. In the deceptive cases, on the other hand, our experiential intake is a 
mere appearance. Hence, McDowell’s view is a form of disjunctivism about 
the evidence for perceptual knowledge and belief: whilst knowledge is based 
on facts, in the deceptive cases belief is based on mere appearances. 
It would be easy to conclude that McDowell’s position amounts to a 
form of externalism. One might think that in his view the reason why the 
epistemic standing of the subject differs in the deceptive and non-deceptive 
cases is due to factors external to the subject. This conclusion must also be 
resisted. Instead, in McDowell’s view the facts themselves are not bluntly ex-
ternal to subjectivity and that is why McDowell’s view is in reality a form of 
internalism. This aspect of McDowell’s position is brought out in sharp relief 
in Duncan Pritchard’s contribution in PAK. The paper entitled ‘McDowell’s 
Neo-Mooreanism’ offers an interpretation of McDowell’s disjunctivism as a 
form of Neo-Moorean response to scepticism about the external world. 
Pritchard’s careful analysis of McDowell position shows how McDowell can 
consistently hold that epistemic support for one’s claims is provided by one’s 
reasons, and accept the internalist constraint that one’s reasons must be re-
flectively accessible to the subject, without denying that in the non-deceptive 
case one’s reasons are factive and thus fundamentally different from the rea-
sons one has in the deceptive cases. These views can be held consistently be-
cause, as Pritchard als o shows, the reflective accessibility of one’s factual 
reason does not entail that one should be able to know by reflection alone the 
(seemingly empirical) fact that one is in the good non-deceptive case, rather 
than the bad deceptive one. 
It is now widely accepted that McDowell’s position does not entail dis-
junctivism about experience, and that McDowell himself probably does not 
subscribe to this view. Considerations for these claims are convincingly high-
lighted by Byrne and Logue both in ‘Either/Or’ and in the introduction to 
DCR. But it is the introduction by Haddock and Macpherson to PAK that of-
fers the best and most patient discussion of the complex relations of McDow-
ell’s epistemological disjunctivism to its experiential cousin. Unfortunately, 
this matter was quite unclear for sometime. The confusion was in part due to 
McDowell’s mention of the argument from illusion in his initial presentation 
of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. It should be noted, however, 
that the converse entailment holds. Hence, disjunctivists about experience 
must also subscribe to disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. 
The section about epistemology in PAK also includes two contributions 
one by McDowell and one by Crispin Wright about the relation between dis-
junctivism and scepticism about the external world. In his paper Wright ar-
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gues that disjunctivism is dialectically ineffectual in silencing the sceptic; 
McDowell, instead, defends the view that this position might not refute the 
sceptic, but nevertheless it undermines its attractiveness. Be that as it may, 
the value of disjunctivism in epistemology does not lie exclusively in its abil-
ity to answer scepticism as many of the papers in the epistemology section of 
PAK successfully demonstrate. 
 
C. ACTION 
 
Disjunctivist accounts in the philosophy of action are a recent develop-
ment but these views are well represented in PAK. Although there are differ-
ent forms that disjunctivism can take in this area perhaps the most interesting 
concerns acting for reasons. A defence of such a disjunctivist account is of-
fered in Jennifer Hornsby’s contribution in PAK. The position is an analogue 
of McDowell’s disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. In the same man-
ner in which McDowell urges us to deny that veridical and non-veridical ex-
periences offer the same sort of evidence for our perceptual judgments, 
Hornsby urges us to resist the temptation to think that the only reasons for 
acting are beliefs, which of course could be either true or false. Instead, she 
argues that our reasons for acting can be factive, they can be given by what 
we know. In her view one of the advantages of this position is that it pre-
serves the connection between normative reasons (considerations in favour of 
the action) and motivating reasons (considerations that explain why we acted 
as we did). This section of PAK also include an essay by Jonathan Dancy 
which sets out why and where he disagrees with Hornsby. In particular he 
denies that we must attribute a specific role to knowledge, as opposed to de-
grees of confidence in belief, in the theory of acting for reasons. He also sug-
gests, for related reasons, that normative and motivating reasons must be 
thought as roughly equivalent. Whether or not Dancy is right on these points, 
there is no doubt that disjunctivism offers the promise of a novel approach to 
the philosophy of action. In general, these volumes are the best place in 
which to look to appreciate the significance of disjunctivism in re-shaping 
old debates. 
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